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1.0 Introduction 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in its advisory standard for geological 
repositories promulgated jointly with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, explicitly distinguishes 
between the concepts of a safety case and a safety assessment. As defined in the advisory 
standard, the safety case is a broader set of arguments that provide confidence and 
substantiate the formal analyses of system safety made through the process of safety 
assessment. [I]: 
Definitions of safety assessment and the safety 
case 
Safety assessment is the process of systematically 
analysing the hazards associated with the facility and 
the ability of the site and designs to provide the 
safety functions and meet technical requirements. 
The safety case is an integration of arguments and 
evidence that describe, quantlJL and substantiate the 
safety, and (he level of confidence in the safety, of the 
geological disposal facility. 
Although the IAEAYs definitions 
include both preclosure (i.e., 
operational) safety and post- 
closure performance in the overall 
safety assessment and safety case, 
the emphasis in here is on long- 
term performance after waste has 
been emplaced and the repository 
has been closed. This distinction 
between pre- and postclosure 
aspects of the repository is 
consistent with the U.S. regulatory 
framework defined by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (Chapter 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 
197, or 40 CFR 197) [2] and implemented by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(Chapter 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 63, or 10 CFR 63) [3]. The 
separation of the pre- and postclosure safety cases is also consistent with the way in 
which the U.S. Department of Energy has assigned responsibilities for developing the 
safety case. 
Bechtel SAIC Company is the Management and Operating contractor responsible for the 
design and operation of the Yucca Mountain facility and is therefore responsible for the 
preparation of the preclosure aspects of the safety case. Sandia National Laboratories has 
lead responsibility for scientific work evaluating post-closure performance, and therefore 
is responsible for developing the post-closure aspects of the safety case. In the context of 
the IAEA definitions, both preclosure and postclosure safety, including safety assessment 
and the safety case, will be documented in the license application being prepared for the 
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o Proposed Schedules for Construction, Receipt and Emplacement of 
Waste 
o Physical Protection Plan 
o Material Control and Accounting Program 
o Site Characterization 
Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 
o Repository Safety Before Permanent Closure 
o Repository Safety After Permanent Closure 
o Research and Development Program to Resolve Safety Questions 
o Performance Confirmation Program 
o Administrative and Programmatic Requirements 
The safety case consists mainly of the items in Table 1 labeled "Repository Safety Before 
Permanent Closure," and "Repository Safety After Permanent Closure." Elements of 
these two sections that contribute to the overall safety case are summarized in Table 2, 
along with institutional aspects of the program that provide confidence in the 
implementation of the technical programs. 
  able 2. Elements of the Safety Case 
Preclosure Safety Case (the case for operational safety) 
o Preclosure safety analysis - event sequences categorized by frequency 
o Safety margin and defense in-depth 
o Analysis of Category 1 & 2 event sequences 
o Industry precedent and experience 
o Technical specifications and surveillance 
Postclosure Safety Case (the case for passive safety after final closure) 
o Total system performance assessment (TSPA) 
o Identification and description of multiple barriers 
o Analysis of potentially disruptive events 
o Insights from natural analogues 
o Performance confirmation 
Institutional Assurance (the case for an institutional environment that 
provides confidence in the technical, bases for the safety case 
o Quality Assurance 
o Safety Conscious Work Environment 
The focus of this paper is on the postclosure case for repository safety. 
3.0 Overview of the Technical Basis for Postclosure Performance 
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results will be displayed as a set of estimates of annual dose to a hypothetical individual, 
whose lifestyle and characteristics are prescribed by regulation. Results will be shown 
with a mean, median, 5th and 95th percentile outcome denoted, to provide decision makers 
with a clear representation of the uncertainty in modeled performance. Figure 3 provides 
an illustration from a past total-system performance assessment. The multiple grey 
curves illustrate the uncertainty in the results. 
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The U.S. National Academy of Sciences provides further support for the use of uncertain 
model results in decision making. In the context of a report on the conduct of 
probabilistic seismic hazard assessments [9] the Academy notes that decisions informed 
by calculations of this nature ought to be based on the central tendency of the distribution 
of outcomes, and on the robustness of that central tendency as new information becomes 
available with time. This expectation that the measure of central tendency be shown to 
be robust as new information becomes available is specifically acknowledged in U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for performance confirmation activities 
that continue scientific investigations of the repository system after construction and 
waste emplacement has begun. As required by regulation and as planned by the DOE, 
performance confirmation activities [lo] will be designed to challenge basic data and 
assumptions underlying the safety assessment, allowing the DOE to confirm (or refute) 
the technical basis for the post-closure safety case during the operational period. 
Additional confidence comes from objective demonstration that the quantitative estimates 
of performance have been developed following sound scientific processes including 
thorough analysis, documentation, and review. Relevant to achieving that goal, Table 3 
lists representative conditions that will help support the conclusion that the safety 
evaluation is credible. 
Table 3. Conditions that support a finding that a safety evaluation is credible 
The evaluation draws from a design and scientific data basis that is sufficient 
to support a meaningful total-system level evaluation 
The evaluation uses calculational tools that have been independently 
reviewed and found to be competent in structure 
Analyses that support the evaluation use the input data and exercise the 
calculational tools competently 
The evaluation considers and explains uncertainties and other features of the 
calculational outcomes to demonstrate knowledge of the system and 
understanding of its behavior 
In all of the above, the evaluation includes consideration of additional lines of 
evidence: 
o Data and information about comparable natural and technological 
systems 
o Comparisons in terms of structure and approach with comparable 
but independently created calculational tools 
o Comparisons with other models applied to the same system, or with 
the current model applied to different systems with selected analogous 
features and processes . 
o comparisons-with, and explanations of differences in, previous 
analyses of the same system by the same organization, reflecting 
known changes in calculational tools and in supporting design and 
scientific data 
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Producing and documenting these arguments is a complex and time- and labor-intensive 
undertaking. Fortunately, for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository effort, there have 
been two independent safety evaluations with independently developed tools. One 
organization also performing safety evaluations for a repository at this location is the 
regulator, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) [ l  11. Another is the nuclear 
electric power industry, through its Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [12]. 
Understanding the differences in outcomes between the DOE, NRC and EPRI safety 
evaluations, in terms of tools, data, and assumptions, is a powerhl additional line of 
evidence for having confidence in the DOE safety evaluations. 
Independent technical reviews also can add confidence if properly responded to. Failure 
to respond to constructive criticism from independent reviewers, including taking 
substantive corrective actions where appropriate, would not lead to enhanced confidence. 
System-level safety evaluations of a potential Yucca Mountain repository have been 
performed by DOE since the mid to late 1980s [4, for a recent example]. These gnalyses 
have been reviewed by NRC as part of a pre-licensing Key Technical Issue (KTI) [I 31 
identification and resolution process. As previously noted, both NRC and EPRI have 
performed system-level analyses over this same time period [ 1 1,121. 
All of the above analyses have been reviewed by technical oversight boards (US Nuclear 
Waste Technical Review Board or NWTRB, and the Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Waste or ACNW). The DOE TSPA has been peer reviewed in the past, including by 
Budnitz, Ewing, Moeller, Payer, Whipple and Witherspoon [14] and by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [ 151. Some of the observations from 
the NEAIIAEA review that provide confidence regarding the reviewed system-level 
analysis are given in Table 4. 
Table 4. Observations and suggestions from the NEAIIAEA (2002) peer review of 
the DOE Total System Performance Assessment in Support of the Site 
Recommendation 
- . . . the general approach to TSPA, and the USDOE approach of building on an 
iterative series of performance assessme&s, conform to international best 
practice. . . . 
- . . . structure of the TSPA-SR methodology, and..  . [the] approach of building on 
an iterative series of performance assessments, conform to international best 
practice. 
-The structured abstraction process linking process-level models to assessment 
models is at the forefront of international developments. 
- . . . the FEP [Features, Events and Processes] methodology. . . [is] in agreement 
with international best practice. . . 
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- . . . places far greater emphasis on probabilistic assessment than equivalent 
programmes in other countries.. 
- 
. . . does not emphasise natural analogues as much as in some other international 
studies. 
-"While presenting room for improvement, the TSPA-SR methodology is soundly 
based and has been implemented in a competent manner." 
Several critical observations were also made in the NEAIIAEA review, suggesting a need 
to develop a more comprehensive safety case (the product reviewed was only a safety 
assessment), and a need to update the regional saturated'zone flow model that provided 
boundary conditions to the site-scale flow (and thus determines radionuclide transport) 
model. 
Natural analogues are generally seen as providing additional, independent lines of 
evidence for process behavior, and may be particularly useful for evaluating models of 
processes that span tens of thousands of years and are therefore not amenable to 
corroboration by direct observation [16]. Among the scientific documents providing a 
general level of support to the License Application effort is one that provides a synthesis 
of natural analogue work done and considered in the Yucca Mountain program of work 
[ 171. This document summarizes information that has appeared in many analysis and 
modeling reports that provide supporting information to process-level models. Each 
technical document that directly supports the scientific content of the License Application 
will, where appropriate, cite specific aspects of the analogue work that gives insight, or 
otherwise supports, the data and assumptions fed into the safety evaluation. 
An example of an analogue being studied by both the DOE and the NRC to provide 
insight, and hence build confidence in the Yucca Mountain safety assessment is the 
Nopal I uranium ore body and mine in the Sierra Peiia Blanca, north of Chihuahua city in 
Mexico. The Nopal I analogue (Figure 5) is comparable to Yucca Mountain in a number 
of important ways. 
(1) Its U02 uranium ore deposit is analogous to spent nuclear fuel 
(2) Its fractured, welded, and altered rhyolitic ash flow tuffs overlie carbonate 
rocks 
(3) Its climate is semiarid to arid 
(4) Its geochemistry is oxidizing, and has been for more than 3 million years 
(5) Its ore lies in the unsaturated zone above the water table. 
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Does all of the above taken together constitute a safety case? We believe that it does. As 
in times past, however, the DOE will also create less-technical documents to explain to 
audiences that are not composed of specialists what the basis is for our asking for a 
license to construct a repository. These less-technical documents will communicat~ why 
we believe there is a basis in our license application for the regulator to find, with 
sufficient confidence, that there is a reasonable expectation of safety should the DOE be 
allowed to build this repository. 
In the spirit of confirming the stability of the primary performance measure of regulatory 
interest, scientific work will continue during construction and will inform the license 
amendment request to allow us to enter the operational phase. Thereafter, scientific work 
will continue to support any changes in operations or design during the decades that the 
repository will be loaded with waste. Prior to final closure, all changes in knowledge and 
design from these previous decades will be used to show that there is sufficient 
confidence in the passive safety of the system to allow it to be closed and sealed. Even 
then, however, there will be continued monitoring and protection of the site, using both 
passive and active means, as long as (hture) society deems it necessary. 
Finally, it should be noted that an essential component of this safety case, and perhaps of 
any safety case, is a high level of confidence that there are strong institutional processes 
in place to ensure that execution of the scientific work and its documentation is sound, 
and that potential problems with the site are identified and addressed fairly and openly. If 
there are significant doubts about the quality of the technical work or the openness and 
fairness with which it is presented, confidence in the safety case will be diminished. The 
creation and use of an effective Quality Assurance program is vital to ensuring that 
technical work is sound and correctly documented. Similarly, the creation of an open 
environment in which those persons most knowledgeable about the project, i.e., the 
scientists and engineers engaged in evaluating the safety case themselves, are free to raise 
concerns will help ensure confidence that potential problems are not overlooked. If the 
proponent and its experts have doubts about system safety, confidence can not 
legitimately be expected in others. The NRC requires, and the DOE strongly endorses, 
the creation of a "safety conscious work environment" (SCWE) in which all participants 
in the project have the right and obligation to raise concerns potentially related to the 
safety (both operational and long-term) of the facility, without fear of retribution. 
Demonstrating that such an environment exists and works is a required part of the 
documentation supporting the License Application. This policy empowers the Yucca 
Mountain work force, at any level, to voice concerns and even to stop work if there is a 
legitimate safety issue. The effectiveness of this program adds credibility to the 
declaration by DOE and its analysts that there is sufficient confidence in the safety case 
to allow progression to the next phase in the life of this repository project. 
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